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Abstract 
Governments are increasingly using randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to evaluate 
policy interventions. Such studies are often understood to provide the highest quality evidence 
regarding the causal efficacy of an intervention. While randomization plays an essential 
epistemic role in the context of policy RCTs however, it also plays an important distributive role. 
By randomly assigning participants to either the intervention or control arm of an RCT, people 
are subjected to different policies and so, often, to different types and levels of benefits. In this 
paper, I aim to identify a set of conditions under which it is permissible, in the context of 
government policy experiments, for investigators to randomly assign participants to intervention 
and control arms of policy RCTs. I argue first that random assignment is permissible in cases 
where investigators occupy a state of genuine equipoise regarding all arms of the experiment and 
the policy to which citizens have a claim of justice to be subject. I then defend a set of conditions 
under which random assignment is permissible in cases where investigators know that one or 
more arms of a policy RCT are either superior or inferior to this policy. 
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 2 
Text 
 
Governments are increasingly using randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to evaluate 
policy interventions.1 Such studies are often understood to provide the highest quality evidence 
regarding the causal efficacy of an intervention.2 By randomly assigning participants to 
intervention and control groups, for example, investigators can minimize selection bias, the 
existence of systematic differences between the characteristics of people subject and not subject 
to the intervention that are potentially correlated with the outcome of interest. In the context of 
observational studies, investigators can never be certain that outcomes are the result of the 
intervention, or some distinctive characteristic(s) possessed by those subject to the intervention 
for which investigators have not controlled.  
 
1 For good overviews of the increasing use of RCTs, see Steven D. Levitt and John A. List, “Field Experiments in 
Economics: The Past, the Present, and the Future,” European Economics Review 53 (2009): 1-18; Judith M. Gueron 
and Howard Rolston, Fighting for Reliable Evidence (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2013); Delia Baldassarri 
and Maria Abascal, “Field Experiments Across the Social Sciences,” Annual Review of Sociology 43 (2017): 41-73; 
Andrew Leigh, Randomistas: How Radical Researchers are Changing Our World (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2018); and Luciana de Souza Leão and Gil Eyal, “The Rise of Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) in 
International Development in Historical Perspective,” Theory and Society, Forthcoming.  
2 William R. Shadish, Thomas D. Cook, and Donald T. Campbell, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs 
for Generalized Causal Inference (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002), 226-278. For a comprehensive critical 
evaluation of RCTs, see Angus Deaton and Nancy Cartwright, “Understanding and Misunderstanding Randomized 
Controlled Trials,” Social Science & Medicine 210 (2018): 2-21. 
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 Randomization thus plays an essential epistemic role in the context of policy RCTs. 
However, commentators have noted that it plays an important distributive role as well.3 By 
 
3 See Edward Diener and Rick Crandall, Ethics in Social and Behavioral Research (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1978), 135-140; Ross F. Conner, “Random Assignment of Clients in Social Experimentation,” in The Ethics 
of Social Research: Surveys and Experiments, edited by Joan E. Sieber (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1982): 57-77; 
Rebecca Kukla, “Resituating the Principle of Equipoise: Justice and Access to Care in Non-Ideal Conditions,” 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 17 (2007): 171-202; Martin Ravallion, “Fighting Poverty One Experiment at a 
Time: A Review of Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo’s Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight 
Global Poverty,” Journal of Economic Literature 50 (2012): 103-114; Stéphane J. Baele, “The Ethics of New 
Development Economics: Is the Experimental Approach to Development Economics Morally Wrong?” The Journal 
of Philosophical Economics VII (2013): 2-42; Christopher B. Barrett and Michael R. Carter, “A Retreat from 
Radical Skepticism: Rebalancing Theory, Observational Data, and Randomization in Development Economics,” in 
Field Experiments and Their Critics: Essays on the Uses and Abuses of Experimentation in the Social Sciences, 
Edited by Dawn Langan Teele (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014): 58-77; Dawn Langan Teele, “Reflections 
on the Ethics of Field Experiments,” in Field Experiments and Their Critics: Essays on the Uses and Abuses of 
Experimentation in the Social Sciences, Edited by Dawn Langan Teele (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014): 
115-140; Rachel Glennerster and Shawn Powers, “Balancing Risk and Benefit: Ethical Tradeoffs in Running 
Randomized Evaluations,” in The Oxford Handbook of Professional Economic Ethics, Edited by George DeMartino 
and Deirdre McCloskey (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016): 367-401; Stephen T. Ziliak and Edward R. 
Teather-Posadas, “The Unprincipled Randomization Principle in Economics and Medicine,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Professional Economic Ethics, Edited by George DeMartino and Deirdre McCloskey (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2016): 423-448; Kim Yi Dionne, Augustine Harawa, and Hastings Honde, “The Ethics of 
Exclusion When Experimenting in Impoverished Settings,” in Ethics and Experiments: Problems and Solutions for 
Social Scientists and Policy Professionals, Edited by Scott Desposato (New York: Routledge, 2016): 25-41; 
Douglas MacKay, “The Ethics of Public Policy RCTs: The Principle of Policy Equipoise,” Bioethics 32 (2018): 59-
67; and Margarita S. Rayzberg, “Fairness in the Field: The Ethics of Resource Allocation in Randomized Controlled 
Experiments,” Science, Technology, & Human Values, Forthcoming. 
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randomly assigning participants to either the intervention or control arm of an RCT, people are 
subjected to different policies and so, often, to different types and levels of benefits. This may be 
troubling when some participants are randomly assigned to a promising experimental 
intervention, while others are randomly assigned to the status quo, which may be no intervention 
at all. For example, from 1985 to 1989, the Tennessee State Department of Education conducted 
an RCT in which students and teachers in 79 schools were randomly assigned to three different 
class conditions in order to determine the effect of class size on student achievement: 
experimental small classes (13-17 students), regular classes (22-25 students), and regular classes 
with teacher aides.4 Beginning in January 1998, the Dutch nonprofit organization Internationaal 
Christelijk Steunfonds Africa worked with the Busia District Ministry of Health in western 
Kenya to carry out the Primary School Deworming Project, an RCT designed to identify the 
health and educational outcomes of a deworming treatment.5 75 schools were randomly assigned 
to one of three groups, with Group 1 schools receiving the deworming treatment in 1998 and 
1999, Group 2 schools receiving the treatment in 1999, and Group 3 schools receiving the 
treatment in 2001. Similarly, in many evaluations of cash transfer programs in low-income 
countries, members of some communities are randomly assigned to receive conditional or 
unconditional cash transfers for some period of time, while members of other communities are 
 
4 Word, E., Johnston, J., Bain, H., Fulton, B.D., Zaharias, J.B., Achilles, C.M., Lintz, M.N., Folger, J., and Breda, C. 
(1990). The State of Tennessee’s student/teacher achievement ratio (STAR) Project. Tennessee: Tennessee Board of 
Education. 
5 Edward Miguel and Michael Kremer, “Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presence of 
Treatment Externalities,” Econometrica 72 (2004): 159-217. 
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assigned to the control group.6 In studies such as these, one may question whether it is just or fair 
for access to a promising intervention to be allocated through random assignment.  
 It would be convenient if random assignment were not only ideal from an epistemic 
standpoint, but also from the standpoint of distributive justice. However, while many social 
scientists agree that random assignment is epistemically ideal, many political philosophers 
question the idea that flipping a coin is a just principle of distribution in all circumstances. Some 
argue instead that when faced with distributive questions, governments ought to maximize 
wellbeing7 or give priority to the worse off.8 
 In this paper, I aim to identify a set of conditions under which it is permissible, in the 
context of government policy experiments, for investigators to randomly assign participants to 
different interventions. The conditions I identify are sufficient conditions for permissible 
randomization and it may be that this set is not exhaustive – i.e. there may be other conditions 
under which randomization is permissible. Importantly, the conditions I identify are sufficient for 
ethical randomization, not for an ethical RCT. Government policy RCTs must meet other 
requirements if they are to be ethical. For example, investigators may need to secure the 
informed consent of participants, ensure that the study is socially valuable, and select 
participants fairly. Similarly, investigators must also no doubt ensure that their experiments are 
designed to be responsive to the needs and preferences of local communities. Some argue, for 
 
6 For example, see T. Paul Schultz, “School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating the Mexican Progresa Poverty 
Program,” Journal of Development Economics, 74 (2004): 199-250; and Sudhanshu Handa et al., “The Social and 
Productive Impacts of Zambia’s Child Grant,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 35 (2016): 357-387. 
7 Alastair Norcross, “Headaches and Human Lives,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (1997): 135-167. 
8 See Derek Parfit, “Equality and Priority,” Ratio X (1997): 202-221. 
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example, that policy RCTs are too often “carried out by rich people on poor people,” raising the 
possibility that processes of community engagement may be an additional requirement of ethical 
policy research. My aim in this paper is thus to identify a set of conditions under which random 
assignment is permissible, not to fully specify the requirements that must be met if government 
policy RCTs are to be ethical.  
In part 1, I provide a brief account of the nature of government policy RCTs and the 
obligations of governments that are directly relevant to random assignment in the context of 
these studies. In part 2, I explore the appropriate role of lotteries in decision-making and specify 
the conditions under which random assignment is a just allocation procedure. In part 3, I argue 
that random assignment is permissible in cases where the social scientific community is in a state 
of equipoise regarding all arms of the experiment. In part 4, I consider the conditions under 
which it is permissible for investigators to randomly assign participants to arms of an experiment 
where this requirement of equipoise is not satisfied. I defend a set of conditions under which 
random assignment is permissible in these types of cases. 
 A central limitation of my paper is that I focus on experiments that are conducted or 
authorized by governments. While, as I explain below, many policy RCTs will satisfy this 
definition, my account does not apply to RCTs conducted or authorized solely by non-
governmental organizations. The reason for this limitation is that governmental and non-
governmental organizations possess differing obligations that are relevant to the conduct of 
research. For example, governments have robust duties of distributive justice to their citizens 
while non-profit organizations do not.9 The questions of random assignment by government 
 
9 For discussion of the importance of this distinction in the context of clinical research ethics, see Douglas MacKay, 
“Standard of Care, Institutional Obligations, and Distributive Justice,” Bioethics 29 (2015): 262-273; and Leah 
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investigators and random assignment by non-governmental investigators are therefore deserving 
of separate treatment.10 
 
1 Government Policy Experiments and Government Obligations 
 Governments are increasingly making use of experiments rather than observational 
research to evaluate public policies. By a policy experiment, I mean the introduction of a policy 
intervention, or the alteration of an existing policy intervention, as part of a systematic 
investigation having the aim of generating knowledge about the intervention’s impact. Policy 
experiments may also involve the collection of data that would not otherwise be collected as a 
matter of course. Policy experiments are different from observational research concerning the 
effectiveness of existing policy interventions since the former, unlike the latter, involve an 
experimental component – i.e. the introduction of a research intervention. Policy RCTs are 
policy experiments that employ random assignment.11 
By a government policy experiment, I mean a policy experiment that is conducted or 
authorized by a government agency or institution. Government policy experiments therefore 
 
Pierson and Joseph Millum, “Health Research Priority Setting: The Duties of Individual Funders,” American 
Journal of Bioethics 18 (2018): 6-17. 
10 For a good overview of governments’ involvement in policy RCTs and how this has changed over time, see de 
Souza Leão and Gil Eyal, “The Rise of Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) in International Development in 
Historical Perspective.” 
11 My definition of a policy RCT is thus very similar to David Greenberg and Mark Shroder’s definition of a social 
experiment. According to them, a social experiment involves: (1) random assignment, (2) a policy intervention, (3) 
follow-up data collection, and (4) evaluation of the intervention’s effectiveness. See David Greenberg and Mark 
Shroder, The Digest of Social Experiments, Third Edition (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press, 2004), 4. 
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include policy experiments that are carried out – either in whole or in part – by government 
agencies or institutions, but also policy experiments that government agencies or institutions 
authorize some other non-governmental party to carry out. For example, a government agency 
may grant permission to a non-governmental organization or private firm to introduce and 
evaluate a particular research intervention. Governments also authorize policy experiments, I 
suggest, when they fund such experiments. A policy experiment that receives public funding thus 
also counts as a government policy experiment on my account.  
 One might wonder why random assignment in the context of government policy 
experiments raises any ethical questions at all. In the context of clinical research, ethical 
questions concerning random assignment are often thought to arise because clinical investigators 
are physicians and so have a therapeutic obligation to research participants, that is, an obligation 
to promote their health-related interests.12 Social scientists, by contrast, have no such obligations 
to research participants, and legitimate governments also possess the authority to make decisions 
about the policies to which their citizens are subject.  
 I grant both of these claims. However, governments possess duties of justice to both their 
own citizens and the citizens of other countries, and these obligations are directly relevant to the 
conduct of policy research. For example, on prominent liberal theories of justice, governments 
have duties to protect citizens’ liberty, promote citizens’ health, combat poverty, and ensure 
access to high-quality educational opportunities.13 I shall the use the concept of justice outcomes 
 
12 For example, see Samuel Hellman and Deborah S. Hellman, “Of Mice but Not Men – Problems of the 
Randomized Clinical Trial,” The New England Journal of Medicine 324 (1991): 1585-1589. 
13 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Ronald 
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2000); 
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to refer to specifications of the type and amount of goods with which governments have a duty to 
provide citizens and non-citizens, and the outcomes that governments have a duty to bring about. 
Such outcomes may include specific levels of health insurance coverage, specific degrees of 
personal security and liberty, certain literacy outcomes, or a minimal standard of living. Justice 
outcomes may vary from state to state, depending on cultural variation and resources, and 
governments may have different duties towards citizens and non-citizens.14  
 Governments’ obligations to realize justice outcomes for citizens and non-citizens are 
relevant for the conduct and design of policy RCTs. First, governments may have duties of 
justice to conduct policy research. Even in reasonably just societies, there is likely to be a gap 
between the justice outcomes governments have a duty to realize (and that are in principle 
realizable), and the justice outcomes realized by the policies currently in place. For example, it is 
arguable that governments have a duty to secure fair equality of opportunity for their citizens, 
that is, to ensure that citizens’ life prospects are not unduly influenced by their parent’s socio-
 
Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Needs Fairly (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and John 
Tomasi, Free Market Fairness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
14 The concept of justice outcomes should not be understood to presuppose a consequentialist account of justice. 
Even if governments have a duty to secure equality of opportunity for their citizens rather than equality of outcomes, 
for example, the fulfillment of this principle can be helpfully understood as the realization of a number of particular 
outcomes – e.g. ensuring that children’s expected economic outcomes are not unduly influenced by their parents’ 
socio-economic background. The concept of justice outcomes is thus intended to identify the policy goals that must 
be realized if a principle of justice – whether consequentialist or non-consequentialist – is to be fulfilled. Nor am I 
committed to the claim that all duties of justice can be expressed as duties to promote justice outcomes. For 
example, governments also have duties to observe certain moral constraints. 
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economic status.15 By comparison with other countries, Canada does a reasonably good job of 
implementing policies to satisfy this principle;16 however, there is still a sizeable gap between 
the outcomes Canada’s policies realize, and the outcomes demanded by fair equality of 
opportunity. The federal and provincial governments of Canada have a duty of justice to close 
this gap to the extent that it is feasible to do so, and one way to do this is to conduct policy 
research to identify policies that would be more effective in raising the mobility rates of low-
income Canadian children. Under certain circumstances therefore, the federal and provincial 
governments of Canada could be under an obligation to conduct policy research.  
For example, in the U.S. context, the Seattle and King County Housing authorities 
recently partnered with researchers to conduct an RCT to identify the reasons low-income 
families do not move to low-poverty neighborhoods which offer expanded opportunities for 
upward income mobility.17 Housing voucher recipients in Seattle and King County were 
randomized to either receive or not receive a suite of services designed to reduce barriers to 
moving to high-upward-mobility neighborhoods, including assistance in search for homes and 
short-term financial assistance. Researchers found that while only 14% of families in the control 
group moved to a high-upward-mobility neighborhood, 54% of families in the intervention group 
did so, a finding useful for the design of affordable housing policies likely to improve upward 
 
15 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 73. 
16 OECD, A Broken Social Elevator? How to Promote Social Mobility (OECD Publishing, Paris, 2018) Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264301085-en.  
17 Peter Bergman, Raj Chetty, Stefanie DeLuca, Nathaniel Hendren, Lawrence Katz, and Christopher Palmer, 
“Creating Moves to Opportunity: Experimental Evidence on Barriers to Neighborhood Choice,” NBER Working 
Paper No. 26164 (August 2019): 1-46.   
 11 
mobility for low-income residents.18 Assuming that different levels of a government in the U.S. 
have a shared duty of justice to improve the economic opportunity of low-income Americans, it 
is arguable that the Seattle and King County Housing Authorities have an obligation to conduct 
this type of RCT. 
Second, and more importantly given our concern with the ethics of randomization, 
governments’ duty to realize justice outcomes raises an important question for the conduct of 
policy RCTs. Since governments have an obligation to realize justice outcomes for their citizens, 
and since policy RCTs involve the random assignment of people to policies which may realize 
these outcomes to different extents, how can government agencies authorize or carry out these 
experiments in a way that is consistent with their obligations? Randomization would pose no 
ethical problem if it were permissible for governments to realize justice outcomes to different 
degrees for different people. However, in most contexts this will not be the case.  
 First, with respect to many justice outcomes, governments have an obligation to realize 
these outcomes for all people and to the same degree. For example, governments arguably have 
obligations to ensure that all residents have access to the same minimal level of health care, 
enjoy the same minimal level of personal security, and have access to adequate nutrition. 
 Second, even in cases where there are justice outcomes that are specific to a certain 
subset of the population, any policy RCT is likely to focus on members of that subset. For 
example, governments may have special obligations to children to realize certain justice 
outcomes related to education. But any policy RCT concerning interventions to realize these 
outcomes is likely going to only enroll children – i.e. members of the subset of the population in 
question. So, when policymakers evaluate a new curriculum innovation by means of an RCT to 
 
18 Ibid, 2.  
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see if it is effective in raising third grade students’ math scores, the RCT will only enroll those 
people who are the targets of the relevant justice outcome – i.e. students in the third grade. In this 
case, the government in question may have a special duty to third grade students that it may not 
have to senior citizens, however, this is largely irrelevant since the participants in any RCT 
relevant to the justice outcomes in question will only enroll third grade students. 
Governments’ duty to realize justice outcomes for people need not imply, however, that 
random assignment is always impermissible. It only implies that randomization must be 
conducted in a way that is consistent with this duty. I begin to outline the conditions under which 
such randomization is permissible in the next section of the paper.  
 
2 Lotteries and Fair Distribution 
 Random assignment is understood by many social scientists to be epistemically ideal, but 
under what conditions is it fair or just to use random assignment in the context of a policy RCT? 
While it is no doubt fair to use lotteries to distribute goods under some circumstances, it is 
unlikely that it is fair to do so in all cases.  
Peter Stone has made important headway on the question of the morally appropriate role 
of lotteries in decision-making and the allocation of scarce goods.19 I draw on his work here, 
providing an account of the conditions under which it is just for decision-makers to make use of 
a lottery. I then rely on this account below to specify the conditions under which random 
assignment is permissible in the context of policy RCTs. 
 
19 See Peter Stone, The Luck of the Draw: The Role of Lotteries in Decision Making (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011).  
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Stone defines a lottery as “a process capable of generating a set of outcomes, in which the 
particular outcome to be expected whenever the process occurs is unpredictable given available 
information.”20 Fair lotteries are lotteries for which equal probabilities can be assigned to the 
outcomes whereas weighted lotteries are lotteries for which unequal probabilities can be assigned 
to the outcomes.21 Stone focuses on the role of fair lotteries in decision-making, and I shall do so 
as well since policy RCTs typically assign participants to intervention and control arms using fair 
rather than weighted lotteries (though I do comment briefly on the ethics of using weighted 
lotteries to randomly assign participants in the conclusion of the paper). 
Stone argues that the role of fair lotteries in decision-making is to sanitize the decision-
making process from the influence of reasons. The distinguishing feature of lotteries as a 
decision-making process, Stone claims, is that the outcomes of the process are unpredictable.22 
When agents make use of reasons to make decisions, by contrast, the outcome of the process is 
predictable – it is the outcome that is responsive to the reasons in question.  
This role of lotteries in decision-making is valuable, Stone argues, in cases of 
indeterminacy, that is, cases where the process of reasoning does not pick out one option as 
preferable.23 In such cases, an “agent must select from a set of options, but is unable to do so 
based upon the reasons for or against each of the options in the set.”24 Where there are cases of 
indeterminacy moreover, there may be a variety of ways to resolve the indeterminacy and make a 
 
20 Ibid, 20. 
21 Ibid, 24. 
22 Ibid, 35-36. 
23 Ibid, 30-31. 
24 Ibid, 31. 
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decision. However, where there is a possibility of such indeterminacy being resolved by the use 
of bad reasons, Stone argues, agents should employ a lottery to prevent the influence of these 
reasons on their decision-making. Lotteries are therefore required, Stone argues, when there is no 
possibility of good reasons resolving a decision, but there is a possibility of bad reasons doing so. 
Lotteries are prohibited when there is no possibility of bad reasons resolving a decision, but there 
is a possibility of good reasons. Lotteries may be either required or prohibited in cases where 
there is a possibility of both good and bad reasons resolving a decision; and are neither required 
nor prohibited when there is no possibility of either good or bad reasons resolving a decision. 
Table 1 summarizes Stone’s conclusions. 
Table 1 
 Possibility of good reasons No possibility of good 
reasons 
Possibility of bad reasons Lotteries may be required, 
may be prohibited 
Lotteries required 
No possibility of bad reasons Lotteries prohibited Lotteries neither required nor 
prohibited 
 
Importantly for our purposes, Stone also considers cases where agents must allocate 
scarce goods. With respect to these types of cases, Stone defends the “just lottery rule:”  
Just Lottery Rule: Under conditions of indeterminacy, if an agent must allocate a scarce 
homogeneous lumpy good amongst a group of parties with homogeneous claims, then 
that agent must do so using a fair lottery.25 
 
25 Ibid, 53. 
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A number of clarifications are in order. First, by conditions of indeterminacy, Stone means 
conditions under which there is a group of people with equally strong claims to the good, and not 
enough of the good to satisfy all of the claims.26 Second, by a homogeneous good, Stone simply 
means that units of the good are interchangeable – i.e. that there is no reason to favor one unit of 
the good over another.27 Similarly, claims are homogeneous if they are qualitatively the same – 
though they may vary in strength.28 Finally, a good is lumpy if it comes in discrete units that 
cannot be subdivided.29 
 Stone justifies the just lottery rule by appeal to the principle of impartiality. In the first 
instance, impartiality demands that agents only allocate scarce goods on the basis of claim 
strength, not on the basis of factors that are irrelevant from the standpoint of justice. In cases 
where parties have equally strong claims to a scarce good however, that is, cases where the 
allocating agent has no legitimate reason to give the good to one party or another, the agent must 
allocate the good in an impartial way, that is, on the basis of no reasons at all.30 A fair lottery 
realizes the value of impartiality in such cases since fair lotteries sanitize the decision-making 
process from the influence of reasons.31 
 
26 Ibid, 52-53. 
27 Ibid, 50. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid, 82. 
31 Ibid, 82-83. John Broome defends something like the Just Lottery Rule on the grounds that a fair lottery is a 
second-best way to treat people with equally strong claims to a scarce good fairly. See John Broome, “Fairness,” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1990-1991), 97-98. 
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To see the plausibility of Stone’s view, suppose that two 40 year old people each require 
a liver to survive, have the same life expectancy post operation, have both led lives similarly rich 
in wellbeing, and do not differ in terms of familial status, productivity, or any other factor that 
might be thought to give one person a stronger claim to a liver than another. If you have one 
donated liver to allocate, it seems obvious that the just course of action is to conduct a fair 
lottery. Stone’s just lottery rule explains this conclusion: since each candidate has an equally 
strong claim to the liver, a fair lottery is the only just way to allocate it. 
 Stone’s just lottery rule is helpful in that it identifies the conditions under which a fair 
lottery is morally required. However, there is still the difficult question of determining when 
people’s claims to a scarce good are equally strong. Indeed, proponents of different accounts of 
allocative justice would argue that the strength of people’s claims often vary. For example, 
utilitarians would argue that people’s claims vary on the basis of the size of the benefit the scarce 
good promises them. Prioritarians would argue that the strength of people’s claims depends on 
whether they are worse off or better off. Desert theorists, by contrast, would argue that those who 
deserve the scarce good in question have stronger claims than those who do not. To return to the 
liver allocation case, suppose that the allocating agent must decide whether to allocate a donated 
liver to one of the following people:  
A. 40 year old – Liver transplant expected to yield 15 Quality Adjusted Life Years 
(QALYs). 
B. 40 year old – Liver transplant expected to yield 15 QALYs. 
C. 20 year old – Liver transplant expected to yield 15 QALYs. 
D. 50 year old with a history of alcohol use disorder – Liver transplant expected to yield 
20 QALYs. 
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Do these people have equally strong claims to the liver? Utilitarians would argue that D has the 
strongest claim since they stand to benefit the most from the transplant. Prioritarians would argue 
that C should receive the liver since they are worse off in an important respect – have the lowest 
expected lifetime QALYs. Some desert theorists might argue that D has a weaker claim on the 
grounds that D bears some responsibility for the need for a donated liver – e.g. if it is the case 
that people can sometimes be held responsible for the development of alcohol use disorder. 
There is thus likely to be disagreement about when people can be said to have equally strong 
claims to a scarce good, and assuming that reasons of utility, priority, and desert are prima facie 
plausible, the cases where people genuinely have equally strong claims to a scarce good may be 
few and far between. 
 As will become clear below, Stone’s account of the morally appropriate use of fair 
lotteries in decision-making will be helpful for determining when it is permissible for 
government investigators to use random assignment in the context of policy RCTs. In short, it 
will be permissible to do so in cases where investigators have no good reasons to prefer that the 
participants be subject to either the intervention or control arm, or in cases where investigators 
have no good reason to prefer that any particular participant be subject to the intervention arm or 
the control arm. In the next sections of the paper, I explore whether there are any circumstances 
where government investigators may find themselves in such positions of indeterminacy. 
 
3 Indeterminacy Regarding the Intervention and Control Arms: Equipoise 
 The first type of case in which government investigators may find themselves in a 
position of indeterminacy is when they have no good reasons to prefer either the intervention 
arm or the control arm of an RCT. In this type of case, there is reasonable disagreement within 
 18 
the social scientific community regarding which arm of the study is superior from the standpoint 
of the realization of justice outcomes. The simplest example of this type of case is where there is 
one justice outcome that is relevant to the RCT, and there is reasonable disagreement within the 
social science community regarding which arm is more effective. There may also be more 
complex cases, however, where the interventions under study are expected to realize multiple 
justice outcomes (A and B), each intervention is expected to realize A and B to different degrees, 
but investigators nonetheless have no reason to prefer either intervention. In this type of case, the 
balance of A and B offered by each intervention would be equally desirable from the standpoint 
of justice. 
Where government investigators occupy such a state of indeterminacy between the 
interventions under study, they occupy a state of equipoise. From the standpoint of realizing 
justice outcomes, government investigators are equally poised between the two arms, having no 
good reason to prefer that citizens be subject to either the intervention or control arm. 
The norm of clinical equipoise is a principal norm governing the design of biomedical 
RCTs. According to this norm, it is permissible to randomly assign research participants to 
different interventions if and only if there is an honest, professional disagreement within the 
expert medical community about the relative efficacy of the interventions under study.32 Where 
the norm of clinical equipoise holds therefore, the expert medical community reasonably 
disagrees about which arm of the trial will better realize the outcomes in question. As such, the 
expert medical community is in a state of indeterminacy, having no good reason to prefer either 
intervention. This norm claims to reconcile clinician-investigators’ therapeutic obligation to 
 
32 Benjamin Freedman, “Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical Research,” The New England Journal of Medicine 317 
(1987), 144. 
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patients, that is, their obligation to promote the medically-related interests of their patients, with 
the need to randomly assign patients to an intervention in the context of a biomedical RCT.33 The 
idea is that random assignment is consistent with this duty if there is reasonable disagreement 
within the expert medical community – i.e. indeterminacy – regarding which intervention is 
actually best for patients. 
The concept of equipoise, I suggest, offers government investigators a way to reconcile 
random assignment with governments’ duty to realize equal justice outcomes for people. In cases 
where the expert social scientific community reasonably disagrees about the relative efficacy of 
the interventions under study in a policy RCT, there is no reasonable expectation, considering the 
expert social scientific community as a whole, that one intervention will better realize the justice 
outcomes in question than the other. Government investigators therefore occupy a position of 
indeterminacy, and so it would seem to be permissible to allocate access to the interventions in 
question by means of random assignment.34 
Unfortunately, the mere fact that government investigators occupy a state of equipoise 
regarding the interventions under study does not entail that participants are treated justly. Since 
governments have a duty to realize justice outcomes for their citizens, they also have a duty to 
implement laws and policies to realize these outcomes to a reasonable extent. Citizens therefore 
 
33 Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Sixth Edition (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 317-324. 
34 [Redacted]. More work is of course necessary to further specify this principle of equipoise for the case of policy 
RCTs. In particular, further work is necessary to specify what the state of reasonable disagreement in the expert 
social scientific community must be for equipoise to hold. For promising work on this in the context of learning 
health care systems, see Alex John London, “Learning Health Systems, Clinical Equipoise and the Ethics of 
Response Adaptive Randomisation,” Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (2018): 409-415. 
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have claims of justice regarding the policies to which they are subject. Thus, even if government 
investigators occupy a state of equipoise with respect to the status quo policy and a promising 
experimental intervention, it may not be just to randomly assign people to either intervention in 
the context of an RCT if citizens are entitled to a policy that is known to be superior to both. 
Instead, government investigators treat participants justly in the context of a policy RCT when 
there is reasonable disagreement in the social scientific community regarding all arms of the 
study and the policy to which participants are entitled to be subject. 
 What are the policies to which citizens have a claim of justice to be subject?35 First, since 
governments have duties to realize justice outcomes for their citizens, citizens have a claim of 
justice to policies that are evidence-based, that is, policies for which there is good reason to think 
that they will be effective in realizing the justice outcomes in question. In the context of 
education policy therefore, K-12 students have a claim of justice to be subject to policies that can 
be reasonably expected to realize certain outcomes related to literacy and numeracy. Second, 
 
35 This question is parallel to the problem of “standard of care” in clinical research ethics. As it is typically 
understood, the principle of clinical equipoise requires that investigators occupy a state of equipoise with respect to 
the experimental treatment and the standard of care treatment – the treatment physicians have a fiduciary obligation 
to provide to patients. See Freedman, “Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical Research,” 141. There is a large 
literature on how the standard of care should be specified, with disagreement on the whether the standard of care 
should be understood to vary between low-, middle-, and high-income countries. See Marcia Angell, “The Ethics of 
Clinical Research in the Third World,” The New England Journal of Medicine 337 (1997): 847-849; Robert A. 
Crouch and John Arras, “AZT Trials and Tribulations,” The Hastings Center Report 28 (1998): 1-9; and Alex John 
London, “The Ambiguity and the Exigency: Clarifying ‘Standard of Care’ Arguments in International Research,” 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 25 (2000): 379-397. 
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governments must implement policies that are consistent with people’s rights. Governments must 
not, for example, implement policies that, while effective in realizing a particular health 
outcome, unjustly restrict people’s liberty. Third, governments must implement policies and laws 
that are consistent with the realization of other justice outcomes. Governments must not, for 
example, put so many resources into achieving certain educational outcomes that they are unable 
to devote sufficient resources to safeguarding people’s physical safety or adequately promoting 
their health.  
For any particular justice outcome therefore, citizens have a claim of justice to be subject 
to policies that are: (1) known to be effective in realizing that particular outcome, given the 
evidence that is available to policymakers; (2) consistent with people’s rights; and (3) consistent 
with the realization of other justice outcomes. With respect to any particular justice outcome 
therefore, governments have a duty to implement the policy that is best proven (to satisfy 1), but 
also, to borrow a concept from Alex John London, morally and practically attainable and 
sustainable (to satisfy 2 and 3).36 A policy is morally and practically attainable and sustainable, I 
suggest, if and only if: 
1. It is consistent with people’s rights; and 
2. It can be implemented long term, given a just system of resource procurement and 
allocation. 
The best proven policy that is also morally and practically attainable and sustainable is thus the 
most effective policy a government could implement to realize a particular justice outcome if it 
acted justly and effectively in the procurement and allocation of resources.37 Call this the best 
 
36 Alex John London, “Equipoise and International Human-Subjects Research,” Bioethics 15 (2001), 327.  
37 Ibid, 327-329. 
 22 
proven morally and practically attainable and sustainable policy, or, BPA (best proven 
attainable) policy for short.38  
 This idea of a BPA policy may strike some as a standard that is too abstract and too 
removed from on-the-ground policymaking to be helpful to investigators.39 There is some truth 
to these worries, but I don’t think they are so severe as to be fatal. First, the idea of a BPA policy 
is indeed intended here as a formal specification of the policies governments have a duty to 
implement. I take no position here on which justice outcomes governments have a duty to realize 
or whether these outcomes differ by government, depending on political culture, stage of 
development, or institutional design. I acknowledge that further work needs to be done to help 
government investigators identify the type and level of justice outcomes that are owed to citizens 
and non-citizens, particularly when people reasonably disagree about the demands of justice. 
However, this task is deserving of a paper of its own. The aim of this paper is rightly limited to 
specifying the abstract conditions under which random assignment is permissible. 
 Second, it is a mistake to think of BPA policies as Platonic ideals that apply to all 
societies. Societies differ – and differ reasonably – in terms of their norms, political cultures, 
 
38 [Redacted]. Might the BPA policy differ from the policy that has been democratically enacted or could be 
democratically enacted? Yes, the BPA policy is the policy that governments have a duty of justice to implement, 
given available evidence and legitimate resource constraints. While I acknowledge that democratically legitimate 
decisions are worthy of respect, questions of legitimacy are distinct from questions of justice – just policies need not 
be policies that are either democratically enacted or could be democratically enacted. The primary obligation of 
governments is to ensure that people subject to their rule are treated justly, and so it is worthwhile formulating and 
making use of a concept of a just policy that is distinct from the concept of a democratically legitimate policy. For 
discussion of these issues, I thank RM and DW. 
39 Thanks to an anonymous editor for pressing this objection. 
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political institutions, and established policy regimes, among other factors. Societies also differ 
drastically in terms of their bureaucratic expertise, fiscal capacities, and social capital. A set of 
policies that are particularly effective at realizing certain educational outcomes in one country 
should not therefore be assumed to be BPA policies for another. There may be no reason to think 
that these policies that work in the former country would work in similar ways in the latter; and 
the government of the latter may lack the fiscal and administrative capacities necessary to 
properly implement them. The identity of the BPA policy is thus likely to be highly context 
specific. In many cases moreover, the BPA policy may simply be the status quo policy. For the 
status quo policy to not be the BPA policy, after all, there must be some off-the-shelf policy that 
is known to be more effective for the particular context in question, and that can be implemented 
long term given the government’s expected fiscal and bureaucratic capacities – a high standard to 
meet. In many cases therefore, government investigators may satisfy the equipoise requirement 
by randomly assigning participants to the status quo policy on the one hand, and a promising 
experimental intervention on the other.  
We have thus arrived at our first condition (C1) regarding the ethics of random 
assignment in the context of government policy experiments: 
C1: Investigators carrying out a government policy experiment may randomly assign 
participants to different policy interventions if they occupy a state of genuine equipoise 
regarding all arms of the study and the BPA policy. 
Where this principle is satisfied, no participant is subject to a policy that is reasonably expected 
to realize the relevant justice outcomes to a greater or lesser degree than the policy governments 
have a duty to implement. As such, government investigators have no good reason to favor 
assigning citizens to one arm of the study as opposed to another. With respect to the fulfillment 
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of justice outcomes, government investigators are in a state of indeterminacy with respect to the 
arms of the study, thus permitting random assignment of participants.40 
To my knowledge, there has been no systematic study regarding how often something 
like C1 is satisfied by real world government policy RCTs, or even whether investigators 
conducting such studies identify equipoise as a normative constraint on study design. Indeed, the 
concept of “equipoise” is rarely mentioned in the rather scant literature on the ethics of policy 
RCTs, despite its importance to the ethics of clinical RCTs.41  
One might argue that C1 is too demanding as a constraint on study design since few 
societies are fully just and so unlikely to implement BPA policies. The most urgent imperative in 
real world societies is no doubt to improve on the status quo, leading investigators to design 
studies that compare the status quo policy against a promising experimental intervention. If such 
 
40 Unfortunately, government policy RCTs that satisfy C1 may still be political unpalatable. A recent study found 
that people tend to fall victim to the A/B illusion, namely, the illusion that a randomized experiment comparing two 
interventions – A and B – in a state of equipoise is less appropriate than the universal imposition of either A or B. 
See Michelle N. Meyer, Patrick R. Heck, Geoffrey S. Holtzman, Stephen M. Anderson, William Cai, Duncan J. 
Watts, and Christopher F. Chabris, “Objecting to Experiments that Compare Two Unobjectionable Policies or 
Treatments,” PNAS, Forthcoming. In addition, Rayzberg argues that investigators must often use a number of 
strategies to manage people’s perceptions that randomization in the context of policy RCTs is unfair, including 
geographic separation of treatment and control groups, temporal delay, and public randomization ceremonies. 
Rayzberg, “Fairness in the Field,” 11-18. See also James J. Heckman, “Randomization and Social Policy 
Evaluation,” in Evaluating Welfare and Training Programs, Edited by Charles F. Manski and Irwin Garfinkel 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 218-222. 
41 For exceptions, see Baele, “The Ethics of New Development Economics;” Ziliak and Teather-Posadas, “The 
Unprincipled Randomization Principle in Economics and Medicine;” and MacKay, “The Ethics of Public Policy 
RCTs.” 
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studies do not satisfy C1, does this mean they are unethical? If so, C1 might forbid policy RCTs 
that could identify interventions that, while not BPA policies, could nonetheless improve the 
realization of justice outcomes for citizens compared to the status quo? To remedy this problem, 
one might argue that a further condition should be added to the definition of a BPA policy. In 
addition to being best proven and morally attainable and sustainable, BPA policies should also 
be politically feasible.42 
In response, consider first that as I note above, the status quo policy may in fact often be 
the BPA policy even in societies that are less than fully just. For example, many societies don’t 
even come close to realizing the Rawlsian principle of fair equality of opportunity, which 
demands that a children’s life prospects not be unduly influenced by their parents’ socio-
economic status.43 However, this does not mean that these countries’ policies are not BPA 
policies. For this to be the case, there must be some alternative set of policies that are known to 
be better with respect to the fulfillment of this principle, and that can be implemented long-term 
given bureaucratic and fiscal constraints. The mere fact that a society fails to fulfill some 
principle of justice does not entail that its current policies are not BPA policies. In my view, 
political philosophers are too often unwilling to recognize that we may not know which policies 
will better fulfill their preferred principles of justice than the policies currently in place. 
Consider second that including political feasibility as a further condition of a BPA policy 
would leave us without the resources to condemn prima facie unjust RCTs. For example, 
currently in the U.S., a number of states have chosen not to expand their Medicaid programs 
within the framework of the Affordable Care Act. Under this legislation, states have the option to 
 
42 Thanks to an anonymous editor for pressing this objection. 
43 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 63. 
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expand Medicaid coverage to low-income adults earning less than 138% of the federal poverty 
level, with the federal government committed to paying 100% of the costs of expansion through 
2016, with the matching rate phasing down to 90% in 2020.44 Suppose the North Carolina 
legislature, which has decided not to expand Medicaid, authorizes the North Carolina 
Department of Health and Human Services to conduct an RCT in which uninsured North 
Carolinians are randomly assigned to either no coverage, or a bare-bones catastrophic health 
insurance plan, with the aim of determining whether the latter plan leads to superior health and 
financial outcomes for recipients. This study would violate C1 since there is good evidence to 
suggest that having Medicaid leads to better health and financial outcomes than not having 
Medicaid,45 and an expanded Medicaid program is clearly attainable and sustainable in North 
Carolina given its own resources and the funding commitments of the federal government. One 
might argue that C1 is too demanding as a standard in this context, since the Medicaid expansion 
is not currently politically feasible in North Carolina, with the legislature unwilling to endorse it. 
However, if North Carolina indeed has a duty to justice to expand Medicaid, there is at least 
something unjust about the fact that it would authorize a study that involves randomly assigning 
people to one or more interventions that are known to be less effective than the BPA policy, 
 
44 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010). Note that under the initial legislation, 
Medicaid expansion was required. In June 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Medicaid expansion is lawful 
only as an option for states. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
45 Larisa Antonisse, Rachel Garfield, Robin Rudowitz, and Madeline Guth, “The Effects of Medicaid Expansion 
under the ACA: Updated Findings from a Literature Review,” Kaiser Family Foundation (August 2019), available 
at: http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-brief-The-Effects-of-Medicaid-Expansion-under-the-ACA-Findings-from-a-
Literature-Review. 
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namely, that it is not providing people with the health insurance to which they have a claim of 
justice. If political feasibility is considered to be a necessary condition of what counts as a BPA 
policy, we would be unable to make this judgment. 
Consider finally that excluding political feasibility from the definition of the BPA policy 
need not imply that it is always on balance wrong to conduct an RCT in which people are subject 
to a policy that is known to be inferior to the BPA policy. C1 is a sufficient condition of 
permissible randomization, not a necessary one. Indeed, I think there are cases where it is 
permissible for investigators to conduct an RCT in which the experimental intervention is known 
to be inferior to the BPA policy, but is in a state of equipoise with the status quo policy. To see 
this, consider a situation in which a government agency wishes to conduct a policy RCT, but 
where citizens are not subject to the BPA policy: 
Healthy Incentives Pilot: In 2011, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food and 
Nutrition Service designed the Healthy Incentives Pilot (HIP) with the aim of 
determining whether Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) recipients, 
would increase their consumption of fruits and vegetables if they were given financial 
incentives to do so.46 SNAP is the principal nutritional assistance program in the U.S. and 
recipients receive an electronic benefit transfer (EBT) card with which they may purchase 
a wide variety of foods. Under the HIP, participants received an incentive of $0.30 on 
their EBT card for each dollar of SNAP benefits they spent on targeted fruits and 
vegetables from participating retailers. The HIP was implemented in late 2011 by the 
 
46 Bartlett, S., Klerman, J., Olsho, L., Logan, C., Blocklin, M., Beauregard, M., Enver, A., Wilde, P., and Owens, C., 
(2014). Evaluation of the Healthy Incentives Pilot (HIP): Final Report. Available at: https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ops/HIP-Final.pdf. 
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Massachusetts Department of Transitional Assistance in Hampden County and continued 
until the end of 2012. 7,500 SNAP recipients in Hampden County were randomly 
selected to participate in the HIP pilot, receiving multiple notifications of the pilot and 
specially marked EBT cards.47 The remaining 47,596 eligible SNAP households did not 
receive the HIP incentive. Data were collected from a variety of sources, including 
through voluntary surveys with samples of both HIP and non-HIP households, from EBT 
transaction data, and from surveys and observations of participating food retailers.48 
I shall assume that the current SNAP policy in the U.S. is not the BPA policy. I shall not defend 
this assumption here, but will briefly note that it rests on three highly plausible premises: 
1. Citizens of the U.S. are entitled to have secure access to food adequate to meet their 
nutritional needs;  
2. Current SNAP benefit levels are too low to ensure that recipients have secure access 
to food adequate to meet their nutritional needs. 
3. A SNAP policy with more generous benefits is morally and practically attainable and 
sustainable in the U.S.49 
Given this assumption, the HIP pilot compares two policies that are known to be inferior to the 
BPA policy, the status quo SNAP policy and the experimental healthy incentives policy. I shall 
 
47 Ibid, 25. 
48 Ibid, 26-38. 
49 For defense of these premises, see Nicole M.V. Ross and Douglas P. MacKay, “Ending SNAP-Subsidized 
Purchases of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages: The Need for a Pilot Project,” Public Health Ethics 10 (2017), 64; and 
Kranti Mulik and Lindsey Haynes-Maslow, “The Affordability of MyPlate: An Analysis of SNAP Benefits and the 
Actual Cost of Eating According to the Dietary Guidelines,” Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior 49 
(2017): 623-631. 
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also assume that investigators occupy a state of genuine equipoise regarding the status quo 
SNAP policy and the experimental healthy incentives policy with respect to the promotion of a 
nutritional diet for low-income Americans.50 I realize these assumptions are controversial, but 
the point of my discussion here is not to pass judgment on the HIP, but to determine the 
permissibility of a policy RCT in which participants are randomized to interventions that are 
known to be inferior to the BPA policy.  
 Now, the U.S. government is not in a state of indeterminacy regarding the current SNAP 
policy, the healthy incentives policy, and the BPA policy. From the standpoint of justice, the 
U.S. government ought to implement the BPA policy. The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 
Food and Nutrition Service however, does not have the authority to implement the BPA policy 
since the principal responsibility for setting SNAP benefit levels resides with Congress. 
Although the U.S. Department of Agriculture has the authority to design and conduct 
experiments on proposed changes to SNAP, it does not have the option of implementing the BPA 
policy. In addition, given my assumption above that investigators occupy a state of genuine 
equipoise regarding the HIP arms, the U.S. Department of Agriculture occupies a state of 
indeterminacy regarding the subjection of SNAP recipients to either the healthy incentives policy 
or the current SNAP policy. 
 Participants in the HIP, like all SNAP recipients, are thus treated unjustly by the U.S. 
government insofar as they are not subject to the BPA policy. However, I don’t think that the 
 
50 One might think it obvious the health incentives policy would be more effective. However, government agencies 
face significant challenges in successfully communicating program changes to recipients. In the context of the HIP, 
only 62 percent of households receiving the incentive intervention reported having heard of it 4-6 months after they 
began participating in the study. Bartlett et al. Evaluation of the Healthy Incentives Pilot (HIP), 85. 
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government agencies and investigators responsible for the HIP commit an additional wrong 
against participants by randomly assigning them to either the current SNAP policy or the healthy 
incentives intervention. Provided investigators occupy a genuine state of equipoise, participants 
in the HIP were not subject to a policy known to be less effective at realizing the justice outcome 
in question – secure access to food adequate to meet their nutritional needs – than those outside 
of the experiment – i.e. SNAP recipients more generally. Participants were either subject to the 
status quo policy or the experimental healthy incentives intervention, which was not known to be 
inferior. 
 My analysis of this case suggests that there is an additional condition under which it is 
permissible for government investigators to randomly assign participants to intervention and 
control arms in the context of policy RCT. Call this condition 2 (C2): 
C2: Investigators carrying out a government policy experiment may randomly assign 
participants to different policy interventions if: 
1. They occupy a state of genuine equipoise regarding all arms of the study and the 
non-BPA status quo policy; and 
2. The government agency responsible for designing and conducting the RCT does 
not have the authority to reform the non-BPA status quo policy or otherwise 
subject participants to the BPA policy. 
Now, in drawing this conclusion, I am not arguing that the HIP was ethical or that all policy 
RCTs that satisfy C2 are just. My interest here lies with the ethics of random assignment in the 
context of government policy RCTs. As I discuss above, for a policy RCT to be just, government 
investigators must no doubt comply with a series of additional ethical principles. For example, 
they may need to secure the informed consent of all participants, ensure the RCT has a favorable 
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risk-benefit ratio, and select research participants fairly. My only claim here is that random 
assignment is permissible when C2 is satisfied.51 
 My account does not therefore always prohibit policy RCTs that compare the non-BPA 
status quo policy with a promising experimental intervention. Where investigators occupy a state 
of equipoise with respect to these interventions and the government agency authorizing, funding, 
or conducting the study lacks the authority to implement the BPA policy, random assignment is 
permissible. However, neither C1 nor C2 permits government agencies to authorize or conduct 
such a policy RCT where they have the authority to simply implement the BPA policy. If a 
government agency has the authority to subject citizens to the BPA policy, they should do so, not 
conduct or authorize policy RCTs in which citizens will be subjected to inferior policies. 
Similarly, if the North Carolina legislature has a duty of justice to expand Medicaid, it should do 
so, and it acts wrongly instead by authorizing an RCT in which citizens will be subject to an 
intervention that is known to be inferior to the BPA policy. 
 Suppose investigators in HIP do not occupy a state of indeterminacy the status quo SNAP 
policy and the healthy incentives intervention, is random assignment still permissible? I explore 
this question next. 
  
4 Indeterminacy Regarding Who is Subject to Intervention and Control Arms 
If government investigators never had a legitimate reason to conduct a policy RCT in 
which they did not occupy a genuine state of equipoise regarding the study’s arms and either the 
 
51 For an account of when investigators must seek participants’ informed consent in the context of government 
policy RCTS, see Douglas MacKay and Averi Chakrabarti, “Government Policy Experiments and Informed 
Consent,” Public Health Ethics 12 (2019): 188-201. 
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BPA or the non-BPA status quo policy, we would have arrived at our answer to the question of 
the ethics of randomization: random assignment is permissible only if either C1 or C2 is 
satisfied. However, investigators often have prima facie legitimate reasons to conduct a policy 
RCT in which these conditions are not satisfied. In what follows, I explore the ethics of 
randomization in two types of cases: (1) cases where investigators wish to evaluate the BPA 
policy against a superior non-BPA policy; and (2) cases where investigators wish to evaluate the 
BPA policy against an inferior non-BPA policy. I argue that it is sometimes permissible for 
investigators to employ random assignment in these types of cases and specify the conditions 
under which it is permissible to do so. In short, it is permissible for government investigators to 
use random assignment in these types of cases when they are in a state of indeterminacy 
regarding who should be subject to the superior intervention. 
 
4.1 Random Assignment to the BPA Policy and a Superior Non-BPA Policy  
First, investigators may have reason to conduct an RCT where they test the BPA policy 
against a policy that is known to be superior in terms of effectiveness in realizing justice 
outcomes, but that is not morally and practically attainable and sustainable, and so not the BPA 
policy. While there may be good evidence that the non-BPA policy in question is superior to the 
BPA policy, an RCT may help investigators determine with more precision how much better the 
policy is and along which dimensions. An RCT may also enable policymakers to more 
accurately estimate the costs of implementing the non-BPA policy. Such evidence may help 
policymakers make more precise judgments regarding the cost-effectiveness of the policy, which 
may in turn inform decisions about whether to work to implement the policy in the future or take 
steps to make its implementation cheaper. An RCT may also provide investigators with a deeper 
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understanding of why the intervention is superior to the BPA policy – i.e. of the underlying 
mechanisms. This understanding may help policymakers improve the experimental policy and 
may also be useful for policy design in other contexts.  
 For the purposes of addressing this type of case, consider the following example, which is 
loosely based on the Canadian province of Ontario’s recent basic income pilot project:52 
Basic Income: The government of a reasonably just high-income liberal democracy 
wishes to determine the effects of a negative income tax scheme. The proposed policy 
offers recipients a maximal cash transfer of $16,989/year for individuals and 
$24,027/year for couples, less 50% of any earned income. Currently, under the BPA 
policy, low-income citizens are entitled to a maximum cash transfer of $8,472 for 
individuals and $13,140 for couples if their income falls below a certain threshold; and to 
receive this transfer individuals must be willing to actively look for employment. 
Government investigators randomly allocate 5000 low-income citizens (individuals 
earning under $34,000/year and couples earning under $48,000/year) to be subject to the 
negative income tax intervention and 5000 low-income citizens to be subject to the BPA 
policy. Based on existing evidence, investigators are confident that the negative income 
tax scheme will improve outcomes with respect to poverty, food security, and housing 
stability, but do not know how it will affect people’s employment and labor market 
participation. Investigators require this data to determine the affordability of the policy 
since the lower the rates of employment and labor market participation, the costlier the 
policy will be. The negative income scheme is thus known to be more effective than the 
 
52 For an overview of this study, see Government of Ontario, Ontario Basic Income Pilot, available at: 
https://www.ontario.ca/page/ontario-basic-income-pilot. 
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BPA policy with respect to the realization of some justice outcomes, but because its 
affordability is in doubt, it is not the BPA policy. 
 In this type of case, participants will either be subject to the BPA policy or a superior 
non-BPA policy. As such, all participants are subject, at minimum, to a policy expected to 
realize the relevant justice outcomes to the extent promised by the BPA policy. Since the non-
BPA policy is known to be superior to the BPA policy, the central ethical question concerns the 
allocation of a scarce good. In this case, the good in question – access to the non-BPA policy – is 
scarce because the government lacks the resources to provide it to all eligible citizens, despite the 
fact that it acts justly in the procurement and allocation of resources. 
 Recall from our discussion of Stone’s work on lotteries that it is permissible to allocate a 
scarce good using a fair lottery when the just lottery rule is satisfied: 
Just Lottery Rule: Under conditions of indeterminacy, if an agent must allocate a scarce 
homogeneous lumpy good amongst a group of parties with homogeneous claims, then 
that agent must do so using a fair lottery.53 
In the context of the above-mentioned type of policy RCT therefore, it is permissible for 
government investigators to randomly assign participants to either the BPA policy or superior 
non-BPA policy if participants have equally strong claims to access the non-BPA policy.  
 Now, one might argue that if one accepts this condition, such policy RCTs will rarely be 
permissible since, as we discuss above, people’s claims to scarce goods often vary in strength 
due to any number of factors. However, I think that in cases where the scarce good is access to a 
non-BPA policy the opposite is likely to be true. The reason for this is that citizens do not have 
claims of justice to access a superior non-BPA policy. Superior non-BPA policies are thus 
 
53 Stone, The Luck of the Draw, 53. 
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different from BPA policies insofar as they are not policies that are currently known to be 
morally and practically attainable and sustainable. As such, governments do not have a duty of 
justice to implement them, or to realize justice outcomes to the extent promised by these policies. 
Access to the non-BPA policy is thus best understood as a discretionary good, a good the 
government has no obligation to offer to citizens, and so to which no citizen has a claim right.54  
 The fact that access to the non-BPA policy is a discretionary good does not imply that the 
government may allocate it in any way that it pleases. Michael Blake puts the point nicely: 
[A] state which gave new cars to all and only white men would be guilty of racial 
discrimination even if it had no duty to give cars to anyone. Those who did not receive 
such cars would quite rightly complain that no valid principle could ground such a 
discriminatory form of distribution. Their complaint would not be mollified by the 
response that the state, in giving cars, was providing a benefit it had no obligation to 
provide to anyone.55 
Even with respect to the distribution of a discretionary good therefore, governments still have a 
duty to treat their citizens as moral equals and so may not allocate the good on the basis of 
reasons that violate people’s moral equality. However, because the good in question is 
discretionary, governments will have a good deal more leeway in how they distribute it than if 
the good in question were non-discretionary. In particular, it strikes me as reasonable to conclude 
that random assignment will be permissible in most cases since random assignment does not 
involve treating participants differently on the basis of socially salient features of their identity – 
e.g. sex, gender identity, religion etc. 
 
54 Michael Blake, “Immigration and Political Equality,” San Diego Law Review 45 (2008), 966. 
55 Ibid, 970. 
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 For example, suppose the U.S. government creates a program that offers ordinary citizens 
the opportunity to travel to space alongside professional astronauts – a discretionary good.56 It 
seems reasonable to think that it is permissible for the U.S. government to hold a lottery (perhaps 
among willing and able candidates) to make a decision about which citizen receives the 
opportunity. The U.S. government has no obligation, I would suggest, to allocate the opportunity 
in a way that creates the most utility or gives priority to the worse off. By contrast, if the U.S. 
government is making a decision about how to allocate scarce vaccines in an epidemic, simply 
holding a lottery is unlikely to be a just approach.57 In cases where the scarce good is non-
discretionary, people often have claims of varying strength and so allocation via lottery will be 
impermissible; in cases where the scarce good is discretionary, this is less likely to be the case. 
 One might object however that the use of random assignment in the context of the basic 
income pilot does not treat citizens as moral equals. First, only certain citizens are eligible for the 
pilot project, namely, those whose meet the eligibility requirements concerning income and 
geographic location. Second, the study involves the unequal treatment of low-income 
participants since some are granted access to the non-BPA policy and some are not. Indeed, this 
line of argument was found persuasive in the case of Finland’s basic income experiment. 
Investigators initially proposed randomly assigning citizens to different levels of basic income, 
including levels far greater than the benefits available to citizens assigned to be subject to the 
 
56 This is not a terribly fanciful example. In 1984, President Ronald Reagan introduced the Teacher in Space Project, 
which granted teachers the opportunity to travel to space as Payload Specialists. 
57 See Govind Persad, Alan Wertheimer, and Ezekiel J. Emanuel, “Principles for Allocation of Scarce Medical 
Interventions,” The Lancet 373 (2009): 423-431. 
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status quo policy.58 However, this proposal was rejected on the grounds that it would violate the 
Finnish constitution, which requires that all individuals are to be treated equally.59 Investigators 
were thus required to test only one basic income intervention at a level that was roughly 
equivalent to the level of economic security provided by the existing policy.60 
 I agree that governments have a duty to treat their citizens equally where this involves not 
treating them differently on the basis of some morally arbitrary ground, for example, race, sexual 
orientation, religious identity, or, perhaps, the result of a fair lottery. However, I don’t think this 
principle always forbids governments from using random assignment in the context of cases 
where investigators are evaluating the BPA policy against a superior non-BPA policy. Let me 
explain. 
 I suggest that whether a ground of differential treatment is morally arbitrary depends on 
two factors. First, it depends on whether the ground in question is irrelevant to the treating 
agent’s realization of one or more of its purposes.61 A morally arbitrary ground is thus one that is 
irrelevant to the treating agent’s ability to pursue some purpose it has set itself. The moral 
arbitrariness of some ground of differential treatment depends second on the relative value of the 
treating agent’s purpose or purposes, that is, whether the treating agent’s purpose is more 
valuable than the purposes of those affected by the differential treatment that would be 
 
58 Kela, From Idea to Experiment: Report on Universal Basic Income Experiment in Finland. 2016. Available from: 
https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/167728/WorkingPapers106.pdf, 12-13. 
59 Ibid, 60. 
60 Ibid. 
61 [Redacted]. 
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frustrated.62 The underlying idea here is that whether grounds of differential treatment are 
morally arbitrary or not is context dependent,63 depending in part on the purposes of the treating 
agent, and their value compared to the purposes that would be frustrated by differential 
treatment. Thus, skill may be a morally arbitrary ground when a government agency is deciding 
how to allocate scarce vaccines in an epidemic; it may not be a morally arbitrary ground when 
that agency is deciding whom to hire for a managerial position. 
Since governments have a duty to not treat citizens differently on the basis of morally 
arbitrary grounds, this entails that governments’ differential treatment of citizens is permissible if 
and only if: 
1. The differential treatment is expected to significantly advance the realization of one of 
the government’s legitimate purposes; 
2. There is no non-differential treatment by which the government may significantly 
advance the realization of its purpose that would not result in undue burdens on it; and 
3. The purpose of the government is more valuable than the purposes frustrated by the 
differential treatment.64 
Conditions (1) to (3) together the express the idea that governments may only treat citizens 
differently on the basis of grounds that are not morally arbitrary. Conditions (1) and (2) specify 
that the ground of differential treatment must indeed be relevant – i.e. non-arbitrary – to 
governments’ realization of one of its legitimate purposes. Condition (3) specifies that the 
 
62 [Redacted]. 
63 See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “Incentives, Motives, and Talents,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 38 (2010), 122-
123. 
64 [Redacted]. 
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ground of differential treatment is morally non-arbitrary by ensuring that the purpose in question 
is more valuable than the purposes that would be frustrated by the differential treatment.65  
 Do policy RCTS satisfy these three conditions? Sometimes. Consider the basic income 
pilot. Recall that the prima facie worrisome unequal treatment involved in this study involved 
excluding from participation people who were not low-income or living in particular geographic 
areas and assigning some participants to the superior non-BPA policy. Both forms of differential 
treatment satisfy conditions (1) and (2). The former does so since such exclusion is necessary to 
conduct an affordable and socially valuable RCT regarding the negative income tax intervention. 
The valuable knowledge to be gained, after all, concerns the effect of this type of policy on the 
behaviors of low-income people and geographical limitation is arguably necessary to minimize 
logistical and financial costs. The assignment of some participants to the superior non-BPA 
policy also satisfies (1) and (2) since doing so is necessary to evaluate its effectiveness as an 
intervention.  
The basic income pilot also satisfies (3). The government in question is aiming to 
produce knowledge that is highly-relevant to raising the living standards of low-income citizens. 
This purpose is highly valuable since the government in question arguably has a duty of justice 
to realize it – i.e. to conduct research to identify the policies by which it can raise the living 
standards of their low-income citizens. The purposes frustrated by the differential treatment, 
namely, the interest of those in the control arm in having access to the basic income intervention, 
are much less valuable. Because the basic income intervention is not the BPA policy, citizens 
have no claim right to it. This purpose is not therefore the object of a claim right and so is not as 
valuable for that reason. 
 
65 For defense of this account of differential treatment, see Ibid, 55-61. 
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While I have only shown that the basic income pilot satisfies (1) to (3) moreover, it is 
reasonable to think that most policy RCTs comparing a BPA policy against a superior non-BPA 
policy will do so. The unequal treatment in question is often necessary to generate high-quality 
evidence regarding the superior non-BPA policy, and provided the expected knowledge is 
valuable, the value of this purpose will usually outweigh the interests of those who would like to 
be subject to the non-BPA policy. 
My analysis here implies a third condition (C3) under which government investigators 
may use random assignment in the context of a policy RCT: 
C3: Investigators carrying out a government policy experiment may randomly assign 
participants to different policy interventions if:  
1. No participant is ex ante worse off, compared to being subject to the BPA policy 
outside of the study; and 
2. Participants have equally strong claims to be subject to any superior non-BPA 
policy under evaluation. 
 
4.2 Random Assignment to the BPA Policy and an Inferior Non-BPA Policy  
Government agencies may also have reasons to evaluate the BPA policy against an 
inferior policy. First, policymakers may decide that a new policy is the BPA policy and so take 
steps to implement it but introduce an element of random assignment in the policy’s roll-out to 
facilitate the collection of high-quality evidence regarding its effectiveness. Such policy RCTs 
violate the requirement of equipoise since the new intervention – the BPA policy – is known to 
be more effective at realizing one or more justice outcomes than the non-BPA status quo policy – 
hence the reason for implementing it. However, in these types of cases, it is often not possible to 
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roll out the new BPA policy to all eligible citizens at the same time due to insufficient resources 
or logistical difficulties. A second, similar type of case arises when the BPA policy has been 
rolled out but does not cover all eligible citizens due to resource constraints. In this type of case, 
access to the BPA policy may already be determined by lottery, thus making random assignment 
in the context of a policy RCT prima facie permissible. 
 In these types of cases, the BPA policy is what I will call a “scarce policy,” that is, a 
policy for which there are insufficient resources – e.g. money, bureaucratic capacity, etc. – to 
cover all eligible citizens. A scarce BPA policy is thus one that is attainable and sustainable, but 
only for some proportion of eligible citizens, at least for some period of time. A scarce BPA 
policy is different from an experimental policy since the former are policies that governments 
have decided to implement. RCTs evaluating BPA policies are thus often opportunistic in the 
sense that the policy in question has been or will be implemented outside of the context of an 
RCT.  
Governments may have a number of reasons for carrying out RCTs evaluating scarce 
BPA policies. First, even when there is evidence in support of a particular intervention, there can 
still be reasons to conduct an RCT in cases where it is expected to lead to higher-quality 
evidence regarding the intervention’s effectiveness, or evidence regarding some particular 
feature of it. Second, governments may have political reasons to conduct an RCT in the context 
of the roll-out of a policy. The collection of high-quality evidence regarding the policy’s 
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effectiveness after all may make it more difficult for a subsequent government to eliminate the 
policy.66  
 Is random assignment permissible in the context of policy RCTs evaluating scarce 
policies? As I note above, policy RCTs involving scarce policies tend to occur in two types of 
circumstances: (1) roll-outs of BPA policies; and (2) BPA policies for which there are 
insufficient resources to cover all eligible citizens. I first consider (1), working through an 
example of this type of case, Mexico’s roll-out of Progresa, a conditional cash transfer program. 
I then turn to an example of (2), showing that the set of conditions applicable to (1) are also 
applicable to (2). 
Progresa: Beginning in 1998, the Mexican federal government began implementing 
Progresa in 495 poor rural communities, a program offering conditional cash grants to 
mothers below a specific poverty level with at least one child enrolled in grades 3 
through 9.67 The grants were conditional on the child attending 85% of school days with 
the size of the grant varying on the gender and grade level of the child, and inflation.68 
Partnering with investigators, the federal government first used administrative and census 
data to identify rural communities that were the poorest and least likely to experience 
economic growth given the government’s commitment to trade liberalization.69 
 
66 Rayzberg also notes that the use of roll-outs or a “temporal delay” is a way to mitigate the perceived unfairness of 
random evaluations in which members of the treatment arm receive an intervention, while members of the control 
arm do not. See Rayzberg, “Fairness in the Field,” 13-14. 
67 Schultz, “School Subsidies for the Poor,” 202. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
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Investigators then randomly selected 314 of 495 localities to receive the program from 
summer 1998 to summer 2000, with the remaining 181 localities serving as controls until 
fall 2000 when they too would receive the program.70 Data were obtained first through an 
initial census of all households in each of the 495 localities, and then four household 
surveys.71 Mothers receiving the cash grant were informed that the program subsidies 
were assured only for three years – the time until the next election.72  
In the roll-out of Progresa, the federal Mexican government conducted an RCT, even though it 
committed to offering the program to the control group in 2000. 
 The challenge for RCTs such as this one is that government investigators would seem to 
be denying citizens access to an intervention to which they are entitled. For example, if, in the 
Progresa case, the conditional cash transfer intervention is the BPA policy, then the Mexican 
government wrongs those low-income citizens in the 181 localities who did not have access to it. 
Note too that the promise to expand the program to these localities once the RCT is completed 
does not address this wrong since there would still be a two-year period when the citizens in 
question did not have access to the intervention to which they were entitled. Similarly, if I am 
entitled to government-provided health insurance, it is unjust for government investigators to 
strip me of this benefit for the purposes of conducting an RCT, and the fact that the RCT is time-
limited does not eliminate this injustice. 
 Commentators have argued, however, that it is sometimes permissible for governments to 
conduct this type of RCT. They note first that if the BPA policy in question is legitimately a 
 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid, 202, 205. 
72 Ibid, 206. 
 44 
scarce policy, it is inevitable that not all citizens can be subject to it. These commentators argue 
second that random assignment is a fair way to allocate opportunities to be subject to the BPA 
policy.73 In these types of cases therefore, random assignment is thus not only ideal from an 
epistemic perspective, but also from the perspective of distributive justice. Resource constraints 
imply that not all citizens can access the policy, and random assignment is the fairest way to 
allocate opportunities to be subject to the policy. Thus, it is permissible to conduct an RCT. 
 This line of argument is promising, but it needs further development if it is to be 
successful. First, if such a policy RCT is to be permissible, it must be the case that the resource 
constraints are such that there is a sufficient window of time to conduct a well-designed RCT. 
The mere fact that it is not possible to roll out an intervention to all citizens who are entitled to it 
at some particular point in time does not mean that it is permissible to conduct an RCT. This will 
 
73 For examples of this line of argument, see Diener and Crandall, Ethics in Social and Behavioral Research, 136; 
Conner, “Random Assignment of Clients in Social Experimentation,” 65; John Newman, Laura Rawlings, and Paul 
Gertler, “Using Randomized Control Designs in Evaluating Social Sector Programs in Developing Countries,” The 
World Bank Research Observer 9 (1994): 181-201; Tami Toroyan, Ian Roberts, and Ann Oakley, “Randomisation 
and Resource Allocation: A Missed Opportunity for Evaluating Health Care and Social Interventions,” Journal of 
Medical Ethics 26 (2000): 319-322; Sarah J. L. Edwards and Simon Kirchin, “Rationing, Randomising, and 
Researching in Health Care Provision,” Journal of Medical Ethics 28 (2002): 20-23; Abhijit Banerjee and Esther 
Duflo, "The Experimental Approach to Development Economics," in Field Experiments and Their Critics: Essays 
on the Uses and Abuses of Experimentation in the Social Sciences, Edited by Dawn Langan Teele (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2014), 101; Timothy N. Ogden, ”Introduction,” in Experimental Conversations: Perspectives 
on Randomized Trials in Development Economics, Edited by Timothy N. Ogden (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
2016), xx-xxi; J.M. Gueron, ”The Politics and Practice of Social Experiments: Seeds of a Revolution,” in Handbook 
of Economic Field Experiments, Volume 1, edited by Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, (Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 2017), 35, 49; and Glennerster and Powers, ”Balancing Risk and Benefit,” 380-381. 
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only be the case if the resource constraints are such that there will be some number of citizens X 
without access to the intervention for time Y where X and Y are large enough to carry out a well-
designed RCT. To put the point another way, if one or more citizens is denied access to an 
intervention to which they are entitled for some period of time longer than would be dictated by 
legitimate resource constraints, an injustice has occurred.  
Second, as I discuss above, while random assignment may sometimes be a fair way to 
allocate opportunities to be subject to the BPA policy, it may not always be so. More 
specifically, for random assignment to be permissible in these types of cases, the participants 
must have equally strong claims to be subject to the BPA policy. Although government 
investigators are not therefore in a state of indeterminacy with respect to the interventions under 
study, they must be in a state of indeterminacy with respect to which citizens should have access 
to the BPA policy. With respect to Progresa, if one community has a stronger claim to the 
conditional cash transfer program than another, it will not be just to employ a lottery to 
determine which community receives it. In addition, in contrast to Basic Income, because the 
conditional cash transfer program is the BPA policy, it is not a discretionary good. Rather, the 
low-income citizens of Mexico have a claim to be subject to this program. As such, the 
conditions under which participants can be said to have equally strong claims to the policy in 
question in this type of case may be more restricted than in cases like Basic Income where access 
to the superior non-BPA policy is a discretionary good.  
The above analysis suggests a fourth condition (C4) regarding the permissibility of 
random assignment in the context of policy RCTs:  
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C4: If the BPA policy is a scarce policy, investigators carrying out a government policy 
experiment may randomly assign participants to either the BPA policy or some 
alternative intervention or non-intervention (which may be inferior) if: 
1. No participant is ex ante worse off, compared to being subject to the non-BPA 
status quo policy outside of the study;  
2. Participants have equally strong claims to be subject to the BPA policy; and 
3. Conducting the RCT does not lead to the denial of a greater number of claims to 
the BPA policy, compared to not conducting the RCT. 
These conditions express the judgement that it permissible to employ random assignment in the 
context of RCTs involving scarce policies provided no person’s claims to the BPA policy are set 
aside for the purposes of conducting the RCT. 
These conditions are also helpful for determining the permissibility of policy RCTs 
where the BPA policy is not temporarily scarce, as in the case of a policy roll-out, but 
permanently so. As an example of such an RCT, consider the Moving to Opportunity Study: 
Moving to Opportunity: In 1992, the U.S. Congress authorized the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development to carry out the Moving to Opportunity for Fair 
Housing (MTO) study. Eligible to participate in the study were low-income families with 
children living in public housing or Section 8 project-based housing located in census 
tracts with poverty rates of at least 40 percent.74 4,608 families, in five large U.S. cities, 
participated in the study. Participating families were randomly assigned to one of the 
following three groups: 
 
74 Chetty, Hendren, and Katz, “The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children,” 860. 
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1. The MTO Low Poverty Voucher Group: Families assigned to this group 
received a Section 8 voucher usable only in low-poverty areas (10 percent of 
the population below the poverty line in 1990) as well as counseling and 
assistance in finding a private unit to rent; 
2. The Traditional Voucher Group: Families assigned to this group received 
regular Section 8 vouchers – i.e. vouchers with no geographic restriction – 
along with ordinary briefings and assistance from local public housing 
agencies (PHAs); 
3. The Control Group: Families assigned to this group received no vouchers but 
remained eligible for public or project-based housing and other social 
programs.75 
The MTO study had two research goals. The first was comparing the costs of 
interventions (1) and (2).76 The second was determining the impact of the intervention (1) 
on the well-being of families and their children, including “their housing conditions, 
mental and physical health, employment and earnings, receipt of social program 
assistance and income, education, and delinquent or risky behavior of children.”77 
Families were willing to participate in the MTO study because demand for Section 8 
housing assistance outstripped supply. As a matter of course local PHAs placed eligible 
families on waiting lists (and continue to do so). 
 
75 “A Summary Overview of Moving to Opportunity: A Random Assignment Housing Mobility Study in Five U.S. 
Cities,” available at: https://www.nber.org/mtopublic/MTO%20Overview%20Summary.pdf. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
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 At the time when the Moving to Opportunity was carried out, the BPA policy was a 
scarce policy. HUD and local PHAs did not have sufficient funding to provide section 8 housing 
vouchers to all eligible residents. Given the number of families involved in Moving to 
Opportunity and the size of demand for these vouchers, condition 3 of C4 is no doubt satisfied. 
Conducting Moving to Opportunity did not prevent HUD or local PHAs from implementing the 
BPA policy in an appropriate way – i.e. Moving to Opportunity did not lead to fewer people 
overall receiving Section 8 housing vouchers. Moving to Opportunity also satisfied condition 1 
of C4 no arm of the intervention is known to be less effective than the non-BPA status quo 
policy, in this case no intervention. 
The real question is whether the study satisfied condition 2 of C4. Participating families 
were randomly assigned to one of the above three groups, but one might argue that some families 
have stronger claims than others to the traditional voucher. For example, a prioritarian might 
argue that those families who are worse off have a stronger claim to the traditional voucher and 
so that it is therefore wrong to allocate the traditional voucher by lottery. Indeed, local PHAs 
currently have the authority to deviate from a first-come, first-served allocation system by giving 
priority to particular types of families, including families who are homeless or living in 
substandard housing, families who have been involuntarily displaced, and families who are 
paying more than 50% of their income to rent their current housing.78 
 My aim here is not to determine whether the MTO study was ethical or unethical. Doing 
so would require a good deal of research into the local conditions at the time in the cities in 
which the study was conducted, and also defending a position on allocative justice. Rather, my 
 
78 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, available at: 
https://www.hud.gov/topics/housing_choice_voucher_program_section_8 
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aim is to show that in cases where the BPA policy is a scarce policy, it will not always be the 
case that random assignment is permissible. To be ethical, participants must have equally strong 
claims to be subject to the BPA policy in question. Importantly, this need not mean that all 
citizens who are eligible for the policy must have equally strong claims, only that study 
participants must have equally strong claims. It may therefore be permissible to conduct a study 
similar to the MTO study if the investigators design the eligibility criteria so as to only include 
people who are similarly situated. The conditions I outline above for the ethical use of random 
assignment should thus not only be understood therefore as principles for evaluating studies, but 
also provide resources for the ethical design of policy RCTs.   
 Might investigators wish to conduct an RCT such as Progresa or Moving to Opportunity 
under non-ideal conditions, that is, conditions where citizens are not subject to the BPA policy? 
For example, suppose a government agency is rolling out policy A, which it knows to be inferior 
to the BPA policy, and wishes to randomly assign participants to receive either A or the non-
BPA status quo policy – in this case nothing – for the purposes of collecting higher quality 
evidence regarding A’s effectiveness and mechanisms. Might it ever be permissible for 
government investigators to conduct such an RCT?  
 I think so. As with the Healthy Incentives Pilot, as long as the government agency in 
question lacks the authority to implement the BPA policy and participants are not made worse 
off than they would otherwise be, random assignment is permissible. To cover these types of 
cases, we can therefore add condition 5 (C5): 
C5: If citizens are subject to an inferior non-BPA scarce policy, investigators carrying out 
a government policy experiment may randomly assign participants to either the scarce 
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non-BPA policy or some alternative intervention or non-intervention (which may be 
inferior) if: 
1. The government agency responsible for designing and conducting the RCT does 
not have the authority to reform the non-BPA status quo policy or otherwise 
subject participants to the BPA policy. 
2. No participant is ex ante worse off, compared to being subject to the policy to 
which eligible citizens would be otherwise subject if they are not subject to the 
non-BPA scarce policy; 
3. Participants have equally strong claims to be subject to the non-BPA scarce 
policy; and  
4. Conducting the RCT does not lead to the denial of a greater number of claims to 
the non-BPA scarce policy, compared to not conducting the RCT. 
 
Conclusion 
 My aim in this paper has been to specify a set of conditions under which it is permissible 
for investigators conducting government policy RCTs to randomly assign participants to 
different policy interventions. I have argued that there are five conditions under which it is 
permissible to do so. These conditions each specify sufficient conditions for the permissibility of 
random assignment. As such, I do not claim that the list is exhaustive: there may be other sets of 
conditions under which random assignment in the context of a government policy RCT is 
permissible. For example, one possibility worth exploring in future work is whether, in cases 
where it would be unfair to allocate access to a scarce BPA policy by means of a fair lottery, it 
would be permissible to do so by means of a weighted lottery (provided such a lottery could 
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meet a suitable epistemic threshold). Some scholars argue that there are circumstances where 
weighted lotteries are a just way to allocate scarce goods,79 and the use of such lotteries has been 
explored in the context of clinical RCTs.80 
One might worry that if the conditions I have identified in this paper are exhaustive (or 
nearly exhaustive) of the conditions under which it is permissible to use random assignment in 
the context of policy RCTs, my account will constrain the development of valuable knowledge. 
For example, as I note above, it is possible that the Moving to Opportunity study was unethical 
according to my criteria, and so should not have been carried out as designed. Such a conclusion 
would be regrettable in one respect, since this study yielded highly valuable findings regarding 
the impact of neighborhoods on the life prospects of children. 
My first response to this concern is “tough.” One of the great moral advances of the 20th 
century was the recognition that participants in clinical research must be treated with respect and 
fairness, and that these constraints may not be set aside simply because a study seems promising. 
So too, participants in policy research may not be treated unfairly or unjustly simply because 
doing so is necessary for the development of valuable knowledge. There may be some things that 
it would be valuable to know, for example, because such facts would greatly aid in the 
 
79 See Frances Myran Kamm, “Equal Treatment and Equal Chances,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985): 177-
194; Jens Timmermann, “The Individualist Lottery: How People Count, But Not Their Numbers,” Analysis 64 
(2004): 106-112; and Ben Saunders, “A Defence of Weighted Lotteries in Life Saving Cases,” Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice 12 (2009): 279-290. 
80 See Stuart J. Pocock, Clinical trials: A Practical Approach (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 1983); Andrew 
L. Avins, “Can Unequal Be More Fair? Ethics, Subject Allocation, and Randomised Clinical Trials,” Journal of 
Merical Ethics 24 1998: 401-408; and Spencer Phillips Hey and Jonathan Kimmelman, “The Questionable Use of 
Unequal Allocation in Confirmatory Trials,” Neurology 82 (2014): 77-79. 
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development of effective public policies, but that we may not come to know because of the 
moral constraints regarding the treatment of people. 
That said, I acknowledge that there may be cases where the unfairness is minor enough, 
and the potential benefits of a policy RCT great enough, that the value of these potential benefits 
could outweigh the pro tanto wrongness of the unfair treatment. After all, it is sometimes on 
balance permissible to infringe people’s rights or treat people unfairly when doing so is 
necessary to promote a greater good. That such cases are possible however, does not imply that 
they are common. Moreover, given that the vast majority of policy RCTs enroll people who are 
disadvantaged along a number of dimensions, including political voice, it is crucial that 
requirements of fair treatment not be set aside absent the most rigorous justification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
